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A Proposal to Require Lawyers to
Disclose Information About
Procedural Matters
BY WILLIAM H. FORTUNE*
INTRODUCTION
Supposejury selection in a criminal case is completedjust before lunch.
The judge fails to swear the jury before breaking for lunch and does not
think about it when court reconvenes in the afternoon. Thejudge calls on
the prosecutorfor an opening statement to the unsworn jury. Assume the
law of the jurisdiction is that failure to swear the jury is nonwaivable
error. The defense attorney is the onlyperson in the room who realizes the
jury has not been sworn. Must the lawyer inform the court of the
omission? Or may the defense attorney hold this information as a "hole
card" to be played only if the client is convicted? Indeed, must the
attorney withhold the information if the client so requests?'
On similarfacts, the Massachusetts appellate court said thatfailing
to disclose exceeded the limits ofzealous advocacy;2 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court "express[ed] no opinion'" about the attorney's ethics but
"Edward T. Breathitt Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1961,
J.D. 1964, University of Kentucky. Thanks to Lynn Sarver and Stacey Scherer,
students at the University of Kentucky College of Law, for their fine assistance on
this Article.
II encountered this scenario while defending a man charged with murder. In the
absence of authority clearly requiring disclosure, I concluded I could not tell the
judge that he had not sworn the jury. I did not reveal the information. The client
was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced as a persistent felon to 20 years. I
counseled the defendant not to play the "hole card" because I thought the
prosecution would welcome a new trial. He insisted that I raise the issue of the
unswom jury. I did so, he received a new trial, was convicted of murder on retrial
(with different counsel), and sentenced to 75 years.
2 See Commonwealth v. Pavao, 658 N.E.2d 175, 181 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995),




recommended a change in the disciplinary rules to make disclosure
mandatory.3
n the absence of a rule clearly requiring disclosure, a lawyer is
obligated not to disclose information which is adverse to the
interests of a client.4 However, judges should be able to expect
lawyers to disclose information about procedural matters. This Article
argues that Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 should be amended to
require disclosure of information about procedural matters. Part I describes
the events in Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co.,5 a case involving a secret settlement
related to Prozac.6 Part II makes the argument for a rule requiring
disclosure of procedural information.7 Part III describes how such a rule
would be applied.8
I. THE PROZAC SECRET SETTLEMENT CASE
On September 15, 1989, Joseph Wesbecker, a disgruntled former
employee of Standard Gravure, entered the company's plant in Louisville,
Kentucky, where he shot and killed eight people and seriously wounded
twelve others before taking his own life.' Wesbecker, who had a history of
mental illness, had recently been placed on Prozac, an anti-depressant drug
manufactured by Eli Lilly ("Lilly").10
3 Pavao, 672 N.E.2d at 535.
4 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998).
5 Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1996).
6 See infra notes 9-69 and accompanying text
7 See infra notes 70-150 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 151-66 and accompanying text.
9 The facts herein are taken from a variety of sources including Winder v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 101 F.3d 1196,1199 (7th Cir. 1996); Potter, 926 S.W.2d at45 1; Brief
for Appellant apps. 2-9, Potter (No. 95-SC-000580); Appellees' Reply Brief apps.
C-H, Potter (No. 95-SC-000580); and Reply Brief forAppellant app., Potter (No.
95-SC-000580). Original briefs submitted to the Kentucky Supreme Court are
available in the University of Kentucky College of Law Library. See also John
Gibeaut, Mood Altering Verdict, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 18; Marianne M.
Jennings, The Model Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility Have
Absolutely Nothing to Do with Ethics: The Wally Cleaver Proposition as an
Alternative, 1996 WIs. L. REv. 1223, 1229-34 (delivering an amusing but
overstated account of the case).
'o See Potter, 926 S.W.2d at 451.
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The wounded and the estates of the deceased sued numerous defen-
dants, including Lilly. The cases were consolidated in No. 96-CI-06033,
styledFentress v. Shea Communications II in Kentucky's Jefferson Circuit
Court, and assigned to Circuit Judge John Potter. Other than Lilly, all
defendants settled or were dismissed prior to trial. 2
The plaintiffs claimed that Prozac substantially contributed to
Wesbecker's homicidal state of mind on that tragic September day. Their
theory was that some individuals become agitated and violent when they
start taking Prozac; that Lilly should have warned health providers and
prospective consumers of this risk andrecommended close monitoring after
initiation of use; and that the tragedy would not have occurred if
Wesbecker had been monitored by the physician prescribing the drug. 3
Lilly, of course, took issue with the plaintiffs' theory of the case.
The trial, which began on September 26, 1994, was trifurcated. The
first phase was to determine if Prozae was unreasonably dangerous and the
extent, if any, to which Prozac contributed to the deaths and injuries of the
Standard Gravure victims.' 4 The second phase, to be tried before the same
jury, would decide the issue of punitive damages. The third phase, tried
before a different jury, would assess compensation.' 5
On December 7, as the first phase drew to a close, Judge Potter ruled
that the plaintiffs would be allowed to introduce evidence that Lilly was
sanctioned in 1985 for failing to tell the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") of adverse incidents arising from the use ofOraflex.16 Oraflex was
an arthritis drug made by Eli Lilly that had subsequently been taken off the
market. Judge Potter allowed the Oraflex evidence because he found that
Lilly had opened the door to this evidence by stressing the company's
cooperation with the FDA in obtaining approval of Prozac.1
7
During the evening of December 7, the attorneys for the plaintiffs and
defendant entered into a secret and unusual agreement. The terms of the
agreement, which were later reduced to writing, were as follows:
" Fentress v. Shea Communications, No. 96-CI-06033 (Jefferson Cir. Ct.
verdict returned Dec. 12, 1994).
12 See Potter, 926 S.W.2d at 451.
13 See Winkler v. Eli Lilly, 101 F.3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing the
events in Fentress).
14 See Potter, 926 S.W.2d at 451.
" See id.
16 See id. at 451-52.
17 See id. at 452.
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1) All terms and conditions were subject to the jury reaching a
verdict; the agreement was a nullity if the jury was hung or the case were
otherwise mistried.
2) The parties would submit no more evidence, including the Oraflex
evidence.
3) The parties would not appeal the jury's decision.
4) Lilly could renew its motion for a directed verdict.
5) In the event of ajury verdict for plaintiffs, Lilly would pay half of
the plaintiffs' costs.
6) In the event of ajury verdict for plaintiffs assessing Lilly's liability
between 0% and 30%, Lilly would pay the plaintiffs $X (the "sum
certain").
7) In the event of ajury verdict for plaintiffs assessing Lilly's liability
between 31% and 50%, Lilly would pay the plaintiffs 1.25X.
8) In the event ofajury verdict for plaintiffs assessing Lilly's liability
between 51% and 100%, Lilly would pay the plaintiffs 1.75X.
9) The plaintiffs would decide how the money was to be divided
between them.
10) Lilly would take care of the subrogation claims of the workers'
compensation carrier.
11) The fact of the agreement and the terms of the agreement were to
be and remain strictly confidential."
Thus, if the jury reached a verdict, the agreement assured the plaintiffs of
at least X dollars while capping Lilly's exposure at $1.75X. It was not a
typical high-low agreement 9 because the plaintiffs were not free to take the
bottom figure and end the litigation. The agreement required the plaintiffs
to try the case until a verdict was reached (or the case was dismissed on
Lilly's motion). As became apparent later, the agreement was structured as
it was so that Lilly would be able to point to a defense verdict as an
exoneration of Prozac.20
On December 8, Judge Potter met with the attorneys to discuss the
Oraflex evidence, which had been the subject of his ruling the day before.
'
8 See Summary of Verbal Agreement (on file with author).
'
9See, e.g., Stewartv. M.D.F., Inc., 83 F.3d 247,249-52 (8th Cir. 1996); Hoops
v. Watermelon City Trucking Co., 846 F.2d 637,639-40 (10th Cir. 1988) (defining
a high-low agreement as one in which the parties have agreed that the defendant
will pay the plaintiff at least as much as the low figure but no more than the high
figure).
2 See Brieffor Appellant app. 9, Potterv. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S.W.2d 449 (Ky.
1996) (No. 95-SC-000580) (setting forth Affidavit of Lisa Mullins Parker).
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However, plaintiffs' counsel announced that he would not offer the
evidence at the liability stage but would instead "reserve the offering of the
Oraflex documents that have been previously tendered for admission into
evidence, reserve that for admission into the punitive damages phase, if
any."21 Defense counsel added that the proof was complete and ready for
argument.22
At this point, by Judge Potter's order, the attorneys and judge went off
the record for a brief discussion. It is unfortunate that the discussion was
not recorded because the attorneys evidently believed that Judge Potter
thought there was an agreement but that he did not want to know the details
of the agreement Judge Potter filed an affidavit in the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in which he summarized the off-the-record conversation as
follows:
I either asked the parties if "money had changed hands" or stated that I
assumed that "money had changed hands." In response I was told by the
attorney for one side (with the other side present) or by both sides that
money had not changed hands. Both sides then stated that a "justiciable"
controversy remained.24
The affidavits of the lawyers present a somewhat different story. Paul
Smith, the plaintiffs' lead counsel, filed an affidavit which states:
Judge Potter stated that he anticipated that the Plaintiffs might decide not
to offer the Oraflex evidence, and that he had spoken with either another
judge or another lawyer with whom he consulted regularly, and whose
opinion he respected, and that they concurred that there was nothing
improper or irregular concerning our decision to not introduce the
evidence, even if money had changed hands. What Judge Potter did ask
was whether or not there were still issues to go to the jury. I specifically
remember this because I was the individual that used the term "justicia-
21 Brief for Appellant app. 3, Potter (No. 95-SC-000580) (setting forth Tran-
script, at 4, Fentress v. Shea Communications (Jefferson Cir. Ct. proceedings of
Dec. 8, 1994) (No. 96-CI-060033)).
2 See id.
I See, e.g., Appellees' ReplyBrief app. G, Potter (No. 95-SC-000580) (setting
forth Affidavit of Edward H. Stopher, Fentress v. Potter (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (No.
95-CA-001215)).
24BriefforAppellantapp. 2,Potter(No. 95-SC-000580) (setting forthAffidavit
of Judge John W. Potter, Fentress (No. 95-CA-001215)).
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ble" mentioned in Judge Potter's affidavit. I assured Judge Potter that
there were indeed justiciable issues to be submitted to the jury.25
Irvin Foley, another of the plaintiffs' lawyers, remembered Judge Potter
saying that it was not important if money changed hands. 6 Joe Freeman,
a defense attorney, recalled Judge Potter saying the he did not want to
know if money changed hands.' Lawrence Myers, another defense
attorney, remembered Judge Potter saying there was nothing unethical
about an agreement to omit the Oraflex evidence and he did not want to
know if there had been payment in consideration of the agreement. 8
The court reporter remembered Judge Potter taking the proceeding off
the record after Smith, the plaintiffs' lead counsel, said he would not
introduce the Oraflex evidence. According to this reporter, Judge Potter
then said that he had anticipated such a decision, that he had consulted with
another judge, and that he saw nothing wrong with an agreement to leave
certain evidence out.29 The court reporter remembered the attorneys telling
Judge Potter that the case was definitely going to the jury.3"
Based on these affidavits, it is fair to conclude that Judge Potter had
been put on notice that some kind of agreement had been reached with
regard to the Oraflex evidence. Apparently, Judge Potter thought that the
defendants had agreed to pay the plaintiffs something in return for not
introducing the Oraflex documents. He was not, it seems, aware of the rest
of the agreement: the high-low agreement, the requirement that there be a
verdict, and that there would be no appeals and no further stages of the
trial. He did not ask the attorneys what they had agreed to, and they
apparently thought he did not want to know. When he went back on the
record, Judge Potter said he would bring the jury in and tell them that the
attorneys had agreed to submit the case without further evidence 3 I
I Appellees' Reply Brief app. D, Potter (No. 95-SC-000580) (setting forth
Affidavit of Paul L. Smith, Fentress (No. 95-CA-001215)).26See id. app. G (setting forth Affidavit ofrvinD. Foley,Fentress (No. 95-CA-
001215)).
27 See id. (setting forth Affidavit of Joe C. Freeman, Fentress (No. 95-CA-
001215)).28 See id. (setting forth Affidavit of Lawrence J Myers, Fentress (No. 95-CA-
001215)).29 See id. (setting forth Affidavit of Julia K. McBride, Fentress (No. 95-CA-
001215)).30 See id.
31 See id. app. E (setting forth Transcript, at 5, Fentress v. Shea Communica-
tions (Jefferson Cir. Ct. proceedings of Dec. 8, 1994) (No. 96-CI-060033)).
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The case was arguedto the jury on December 9, 1994. Three days later,
the jury found Eli Lilly not to be at fault.32 Lilly broadcast the verdict as
proof of Prozac's safety. An affidavit filed in the court of appeals
summarized the press releases:
"Lilly's chairman, Randall L. Tobias, said in a statement thatthe company
now had 'proven in a court oflaw ... that Prozac is safe and effective."' 33
"The verdict was crucial to Lilly because Prozac is the company's best-
selling drug .... A verdict against Prozac could have been a public
relations disaster for Lilly."34
"A jury's verdict clearing Prozac of inciting a Louisville man to mass
murder has lifted a cloud over the anti-depressant and may even boost
sales of the Eli Lilly and Co. drug. 35
"'I would assume that some of these 160 [other pending Prozac cases]
would either be dismissed or just dropped,' in part because of the
enormous resources Lilly invested in defending the Wesbecker case, said
Ed West, a Lilly spokesman. 'When you peel it all back you get into a
question ofmoney .... If it becomes apparent it's very difficult to win big
money in Prozac suits, this probably sends some message."' 3 6
"'We feel this was a complete vindication for the drug. It should
absolutely answer the question once and for all,' said Lilly lawyer Joe
Freeman. 37
As reported in the court of appeals affidavit, a Lilly trial attorney,
appearing on a Prime Time Court television program on December 30,
32 See Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S.W.2d 449,452 (Ky. 1996).
33 BriefforAppellantapp. 9,Potter(No. 95-SC-000580) (setting forth Affidavit
of Lisa Mullins Parker, Fentress (No. 95-CA-001215) (quoting Jury Rules Out
Drug as Factor in Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1994, at A22)).
I' Id. (quoting Jury Clears Prozac in Killing Spree, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec.
13, 1994, at Al).
35 Id. (quoting Verdict May Boost Sales ofProzac, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Dec.
13, 1994).
16Id. (quoting Leslie Scanlon& ToddMurphy, WesbeckerRampage NotLinked
to Prozac: Decision May Not Affect Other Cases, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), Dec. 13, 1994, at Al).37 Id. (quoting Prozac Not to Blame in Slaying, Jury Says, USA TODAY, Dec.
13, 1994, at A3).
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1994, implied that the company had not paid anything in the Wesbecker
case. "'Moderator: Why don't you settle the [pending Prozac cases]? John
McGoldrick (Lilly trial attorney): The company feels very strongly that
when it is right it defends its medicines."' 3 In the ensuing dialogue, one
of the plaintiff's attorneys goes along with the charade, implying that Lilly
had achieved "total victory." 39
The attorneys made a number of statements to Judge Potter, as well as
to the press, which misrepresented the situation. At the time of the off-the-
record proceeding, the plaintiffs' lead counsel stated he would reserve the
Oraflex evidence to the punitive damages phase, if any, knowing, of
course, that the agreement precluded punitive damages.' On December 8,
1994, before the case was submitted to the jury, the defense attorneys
argued that the compensatory damages phase ought to proceed the punitive
damages phase, knowing that under the agreement the trial would have no
further phases.4 The attorneys appeared to concur in Judge Potter's
suggestion on December 12 that the case be mediated if there was a
plaintiffs' verdict (indicating he did not understand the nature of the
agreement). 42 Plaintiffs' attorney asked about a date for the punitive
damages trial (which he knew could not occur).43 Also, attorneys for both
plaintiffs and defendant played dumb when Judge Potter asked them on
December 12 if they had a "clue" how a juror got the idea that the case had
been settled.' After the defense verdict, plaintiffs' lead counsel was quoted
in the Indianapolis Star as saying an appeal would be up to the plaintiffs
(when he knew there would be no appeal).45
Judge Potter entered a judgment on the jury verdict dismissing the
plaintiffs' claims.46 Then, having gotten wind of the secret agreement,
38 Id. (quoting Prime Time Court (syndicated television broadcast, Dec. 20,
1994)).
39 Id. (quoting Prime Time Court (syndicated television broadcast, Dec. 20,
1994)).40 See id. app. 3 (setting forth Transcript, at4, Fentress v. Shea Communications
(Jefferson Cir. Ct. proceedings of Dec. 8, 1994) (No. 96-CI-060033)).
41 See id. app. 5 (setting forth Transcript, at 54, Fentress (No. 96-CI-060033)).
"
2 See id. app. 7 (setting forth Transcript, at 13-14, Fentress (No. 96-CI-
060033)).
"
3 See id. app. 8 (setting forth Transcript, at 16, Fentress (No. 96-CI-060033)).
"Reply Brief for Appellant app., Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S.W.2d 449
(Ky. 1996) (No. 95-SC-000580) (setting forth Transcript, at 23-30, Fentress (No.
96-CI-060033)).
41 See Brief for Appellant app. 9, Potter (No. 95-SC-000580) (setting forth
Affidavit of Lisa Mullins Parker, Fentress (No. 96-CI-060033)).
46 See Potter, 926 S.W.2d at 452.
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Judge Potter sua sponte moved on April 19, 1995, to correct the judgment
pursuant to CR 60.0 14 due to an alleged clerical mistake.4 8 He subpoenaed
the attorneys to a hearing to determine the accuracy of the court's
judgment.
Counsel for both sides united to fight Judge Potter's attempt to smoke
out their secret agreement. They sought a writ from the Kentucky Court of
Appeals to prohibit Judge Potter from enforcing the subpoenas and
proceeding with the CR 60.01 hearing. They also denied there had been a
settlement.49" 'The case was decidedby jury verdict. It was not settled."', 0
The plaintiffs' lead counsel went further. He told the New Jersey Law
Journal that "'there was no secret settlement. That's absolutely not
correct."' 5 He went on to say he had made a" 'judgment call' "to reserve
the Oraflex evidence until the punitive damages phase, but
"'[u]nfortunately we didn't get to that point."', 2
On June 15, 1995, the court of appeals granted the writ of prohibition,
reasoning that Judge Potter had lost jurisdiction to correct the judgment.53
Judge Potter appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, which unanimously
held that a trial judge has the inherent power to insure that its judgments
are "correct and accurately reflect the truth."54
Once the trial judge had reason to believe that there was some absence of
accuracy in its judgment so that the judgment did not properly conform
to the true facts of the case, the trial judge had a duty, as well as a right,
to investigate by means of a hearing to determine that the judgment
accurately reflected the truth. The trial judge has inherent power to
execute this responsibility. 55
The court went on to say that the inherent power of the court goes
beyond actual fraud to encompass "bad faith conduct, abuse of judicial
process, any deception of the court and lack of candor to the court....
47 See KY. R. Civ. P. 60.01.
48 See Potter, 926 S.W.2d at 452.49 See id.
0 Affidavit of Lisa Mullins Parker, Fentress (No. 96-CI-060033) (quoting Eli
Lilly Settled Prozac Case, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 21, 1995, at El).
51 Id. (quoting Kentucky Fried Verdict Up for Grabs, N.J. L.J., May 15, 1995).521d. (quoting Kentucky Fried Verdict Up for Grabs, N.J. L.J., May 15, 1995).
53 See Potter, 926 S.W.2d at 452.




Even the slightest accommodation of deceit or a lack of candor in any
material respect quickly erodes the validity of the process."56 The court
then directed Judge Potter to hold a hearing to determine the "true nature
of the settlement between the parties so as to ensure the integrity and
accuracy of the judgment of the court."'57
Note that the court and Judge Potter characterized the agreement of
December 8 as a "settlement." 8 The attorneys involved, however, rejected
that characterization. As reported in the press in May 1995, when the
attorneys sought a writ of prohibition from the court of appeals, "[b]oth
sides... adamantly maintain there was no settlement or any agreement that
settled or decided the question of Lilly's liability. 'The issue of liability,'
both parties say in the writ of prohibition, 'was resolved only by the jury
verdict.' ,'9 The attorneys asked the Kentucky Supreme Court to modify the
Potter opinion to remove the characterization of the agreement as a
"settlement." The court denied the motion.6 A year later, a Lilly spokes-
man defended the agreement and insisted that it was not a settlement. "If
a settlement had happened, why would we want it to go to a jury?"'
After the supreme court ruling, Judge Potter appointed an assistant
attorney general as friend of the court to investigate the circumstances
leading up to and surrounding the agreement. The friend of the court
investigated and filed a comprehensive report, which was made part of the
circuit court record.62 On the joint motion of the parties, Judge Potter filed
an amended judgment on March 24,1997, indicating that the case had been
settled. He then withdrew from the case.63 Except for the amount paid by
Lilly (acknowledged to be substantial), the papers and pleadings in the case
were unsealed.'
56 Id. at 454.
57Id
58 Id.
59Affidavit of Lisa Mullins Parker, Fentress v. Potter (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (No.
95-CA-00 1215) (quoting Kentucky Fried Verdict Up for Grabs, N.J. L.J., May 15,
1995).
6 See Order, Potterv. Fentress (Ky. Oct. 18,1996) (No. 95-SC-580-MR) (copy
on file with author).
61 Gibeaut, supra note 9, at 18.
62 See Letter from Ann M. Sheadel, Office of the Attorney General, to Judge
John Potter et al. (Feb. 10, 1997) (on file with author).
63 See Court Ruling Means Prozac Settlement to Remain Secret, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Jan. 7, 1998, at B02.
6' See Order, Fentress v. Shea Communications (Jefferson Cir. Ct. entered on
Dec. 23, 1996) (No. 96-CI-06033) (copy on file with author).
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In January 1998, Judge Edwin Schroering, who inherited the case after
Judge Potter recused himself, dismissed the case as settled.6" In ending the
legal controversy, Judge Schroering refused to order the amount paid to be
revealed, holding that such a revelation would cause irreparable injury to
Lilly.66
Why did the parties enter into the secret settlement? The plaintiffs'
motivation is obvious. Wesbecker intentionally shot his victims. To hold
Lilly liable, the jury would have to believe that Prozac caused him to act
as he did. Prozac was and is a widely-used and effective anti-depressant.
It had been approved by the FDA. Wesbecker, who had a history of mental
illness, had threatened his co-workers before he started taking Prozac. The
plaintiffs must have known that the chances of the jury finding Lilly liable
were slim. The settlement guaranteed them a substantial sum even if the
jury found no liability.
Lilly's motivation is more subtle. Lilly apparently wanted to take a
Prozac case to trial in the hope that a defense verdict would deter
litigation.67 Lilly wanted a public relations victory but did not want to
expose itself to a huge damage award. The arrangement thus restricted
damages to a maximum of $1.75X, where X represents the sum that Lilly
promised to pay if it was exonerated. The most that Lilly could have been
liable for was an additional 75% ofX.68 The arrangement worked as Lilly
had hoped. There was a defense verdict, and Lilly could thus crow that the
jury had exonerated the product and imply that no money had been paid to
the plaintiffs. It obviously would not have deterred potential plaintiffs to
announce that Lilly had paid the plaintiffs a substantial sum even though
exonerated by the jury.
Of course, the public relations effect was not what Lilly sought. When
Judge Potter sniffed out the secret agreement, the resulting publicity undid
the deterrent effect of the verdict andraised questions about Lilly's ethics.69
In retrospect, it is clear that the attorneys erred in not telling Judge
Potter about the agreement. This error was magnified by misstatements to
the court, which appear to be the result of the attorneys assuming that
Judge Potter did not want to know about the agreement or that he could not
be trusted to keep the agreement secret.
65 See Settlement in Prozac Case to Remain Secret, Judge Rules, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Jan. 7, 1998, at B4.66 See id.
6 See id. James Bums, A Lilly lawyer, acknowledged that the jury verdict "was
used to discourage others from pursuing litigation against Prozac." Id.68 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69 See Gibeaut, supra note 9, at 18.
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II. ATTORNEYS SHOULD BE REQUIRED
TO DISCLOSE PROCEDURAL INFORMATION
It is often said that lawyers are officers of the court.70 While some have
used that term to refer to attorneys' ethical obligations generally, it more
commonly refers to lawyers' obligations to the judicial system. These
obligations may sometimes supersede lawyers' obligations to their clients.71
The assumption, which often is at odds with reality, is that attorneys will
strive to do justice rather than simply to win.72 As Professor Gaetke notes,
by calling themselves officers of the court, lawyers claim that they are
more than mere agents of their clients.'
The organized bar's explicit and repeated characterization of lawyers as
officers of the court clearly conveys the impression that the model
strongly influences the balance created by the existing law of legal ethics.
Certainly that impression is an appealing one for the profession to create.
The virtuous overtones of the officer of the court label and the positive
public image that it generates accrue directly to the lawyers themselves.
By asserting that their profession is somehow imbued with a public or
judicial element, lawyers distinguish themselves favorably from other
occupational groups that serve their own clientele as paid agents,
concerned only with their principals' narrow private interests. The
characterization allows lawyers to emphasize to all who will listen the
public nature of their calling, as well as their critical role in the serious
matters of society.7
4
70See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 64 (1992); Gentile v. State Bar,
501 U.S. 1030, 1072 (1991). A Westlaw search of the federal courts database
discloses more than 250 opinions since 1990 referring to lawyers as "officers of the
court." Search of Westlaw, ALLFEDS database (May 13, 1999).
71 See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV.
39, 42 (1989). In Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1305 (1998), for example, a federal court of appeals upheld a trial
judge's order for an attorney to remove a political button. "As an officer of the
court," the lawyer had no right to insert his political views into the controversy. Id.
at 27.
72 See In re Bruce Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263, 1285 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deniedsub
nom., Office of President v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998)
("Necessitated by the nature of the lawyer's function, the attorney-client privilege
enables the lawyer as an officer of the court properly to advise the client, including
facilitating compliance with the law.").
73 See Gaetke, supra note 71, at 43.
74 Id. at 44-45.
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The disciplinary codes promulgated by the American Bar Association
(the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct) require attorneys to observe certain rules of
litigation behavior.75 This Article opines that judges have a right to expect
attorneys to voluntarily disclose information which can fairly be character-
ized as relating to "procedural" matters, i.e., not relevant to the merits of
the controversy. The Fentress agreement falls into this category. If judges
have a right to expect information about procedural matters to be disclosed,
attorneys should have an ethical obligation to volunteer such information.
Model Rule 3.3 should be amended to make this obligation explicit.76
Model Rule 3.3 presently requires attorneys to volunteer information
in three situations: 1) where it is necessary to do so to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by the client;' 2) where the judge is apparently
unaware of case or statutory law in the controlling jurisdiction directly
contrary to the client's position;7" and 3) in ex parte proceedings where the
judge should know of adverse facts in order to rule.79 In these three
contexts, the attorney, as an officer of the court, must volunteer information
even if the information is adverse to the client."0 Model Rule 3.3 would be
improved bythe following addition: "Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal
a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:' '81 (5) fail to disclose to the tribunal
relevant and material information about procedural matters of the case
known to the lawyer and not disclosed by opposing counsel. The comment
to the new rule might read as follows:
Obligation to Disclose Information about Procedural Matters
As officers of the court, advocates have a duty to disclose to the
tribunal relevant and material information about procedural matters.
Tribunals have a right to expect attorneys to reveal information about
procedural matters, that is matters which do not affect the merits of
the controversy. While no listing can be complete, the following
7"See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102,7-106
(1980); MODELRULES OFPROFESSIONALCONDUCT Rules 3.3,3.4,3.5 (1998). The
Model Code was originally promulgated in 1969, and the Model Rules in 1983.
76 The Model Rules are currently being studied by the ABA's Ethics 2000
Committee. Proceedings can be found in the ABA website at <http://www.abanet
org/cpr/e2k>.
77 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(2).
71 See id. Rule 3.3(a)(3).
71 See id. Rule 3.3(d).
8' See Gaetke, supra note 71, at 62-63.
81MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3.
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should ordinarily be considered procedural: jurisdictional issues,
mootness, real party in interest, settlements, identity, procedural
errors by the judge not relating to the merits of the controversy, and
errors as to the record.
A. The Argument Based on the Implicit Agreement of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing
Model Rule 3.3(a)(1) says that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make
a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal." 2 The comment says
that there are circumstances where failure to disclose is the equivalent of
an affirmative misrepresentation. 3 This Article argues that an attorney is
obligated to volunteer information in two situations: 1) where the judge is
laboring under a misunderstanding that is attributable, at least in part, to the
actions of the attorney; and 2) where disclosure is necessary to correct the
judge's mistake about a basic assumption.
In the Fentress case, the attorneys failed to meet either obligation.
After the in-chambers meeting of December 8, 1994, they knew that Judge
Potter misapprehended the agreement. It is clear from the record that he
was unaware that the parties had agreed there would be no punitive damage
trial or appeal. They had the opportunity to correct his misunderstanding,
but they did not. Rather, they reinforced it. When a juror asked about the
case having been settled, Judge Potter said it had not and asked if anyone
knew what the juror might have heard.84 The attorneys played dumb. They
were under an obligation at thatpoint, if notbefore, to reveal the agreement
because they knew that the agreement was capable of being considered a
"settlement," as the supreme court later characterized it.85
More fundamentally, however, the attorneys were obliged to tell Judge
Potter what they had done. As long as there was a verdict, Lilly would pay
the plaintiffs $X but not more than $1.75X. There would be no appeal, no
punitive damages trial, and no compensatory damages trial.86 Judge Potter
was entitled to know what they had done in order to manage his calendar
82Id. Rule 3.3(a)(1).
83See id. Rule 3.3 cmt.; cf ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 98-412 (1998) (discussing the duty to correct statements which
were believed to be correct when made but are later determined to have been
incorrect).84 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
15 See supra text accompanying note 58.
" See supra note 18 and accompanying text
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and to consider whether the jury and public should be told of the nature of
the agreement. Ajudge is entitled to know that the parties have entered into
a partial settlement.
When an attorney files a complaint or enters a court appearance in
some other way and the case is assigned to a judge, a relationship
analogous to a contractual one is established between the judge and the
attorney, with obligations flowing inboth directions. The judge is obligated
to be impartial, diligent, courteous, and faithful to the law.87 As an officer
of the court, the attorney has a number of obligations to the judge, among
them to plead in good faith,88 expedite litigation (consistent with the
client's interests), 9 disclose false testimony under certain circumstances,"
and disclose adverse authorities not otherwise made known to the court.91
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that nondisclosure is
equivalent to an assertion when a person knows that disclosure of the fact
would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on
which that party is making the contract and if nondisclosure of the fact
amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing.92 The Restatement's examples reflect the
marketplace's notions of"fair dealing." For example, there is an obligation
to reveal latent defects but no obligation to reveal external events which
affect value.93
If the same standard is applied to lawyers and judges, the question is:
what are "basic assumptions"? The nondisclosure of such assumptions
should amount to a breach of the obligation to act in good faith and in
accord with notions of fair dealing between counsel and the court. The
standard should be that lawyers, as officers of the court, will voluntarily tell
the judge of procedural information which the judge should have in order
to fairly and expeditiously handle the litigation. One basic assumption is
that things are as they appear to be. In other words, the parties' actual
positions are the same as their apparent positions.
87 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990).
88 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1998);
Gaetke, supra note 71, at 62-64.
89 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2.
90 See id. Rule 3.3(a)(4); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 87-353 (1987).
9' See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3).
92See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1979).
' See, e.g., id. § 161 illus. 4, 7.
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In Potter, what was not disclosed was an agreement which affected the
court as well as the parties because the agreement eliminated any punitive
and compensatory damages trials.94 The agreement also reducedthe amount
in controversy to $.75X, the difference between the low and high figures.9
Whether or not the jury or the public was entitled to know of the agree-
ment, it is clear that Judge Potter was entitled to know of it. He was entitled
to know the amount in controversy, he was entitled to know that there
would be no appeal, and he was entitled to know there would be no
punitive or compensatory phases.
In two of its present subsections, Model Rule 3.3 requires disclosure
of procedural information. Like the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility,96 Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) requires the disclosure of directly adverse
legal authority.9 7 Adverse legal authority might be procedural or substan-
tive. Professor Gaetke describes the obligation to reveal adverse authority
as "the most noteworthy example of the... subordination of the interests
of the client and the lawyer in favor of those of the judicial system." 98 The
adverse effect on a client can be dramatic. Assume a lawyer represents a
client who has pled guilty to a criminal offense. Because the client has no
record, the judge is inclined toward probation. However, the defense
attorney knows that a recently passed law precludes probation for the
offense. The judge does not appear to be aware of the change in the law.
The defense lawyer is ethically obligated to tell the judge that his client
cannot be probated even if the prosecutor is aware of the change in the law
and willing to go along with probation. The obligation to reveal runs to the
court, not to the opposing party.
While it is suspected that few lawyers would subordinate the client's
interests in the above situation,99 attorneys are theoretically subject to
94 See supra note 18 and accompanying text
95See supra note 18 and accompanying text.96See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(B) (1980).
9 7See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1998).
Kentucky is one of the few states which does not require disclosure of adverse
authority. The author served on the committee which considered the Model Rules
and proposed a set of rules to the Kentucky Supreme Court. The committee
recommended adoption of Model Rule 3.3(a)(3), which would have carried
forward the disclosure obligation of the Code. For reasons never made clear, the
Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the recommendation. See KY. SuP. CT. R. 3.3.
" Gaetke, supra note 71, at 57.
99 See Monroe Freedman, Arguing the Law in an Adversary System, 16 GA. L.
REv. 833,837 (1982) (citing a study of the District of Columbia Bar in which 93%
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sanction if they do not "reveal cases and statutes of the controlling
jurisdiction that the court needs to be aware of in order to rule intelligently
on the matter."'1' The premise of the rule is that judges have a right to
expect the assistance of the attorneys in ascertaining the law. As officers
of the court, attorneys must help the judge if the judge is mistaken or
unaware of the law. If attorneys are obligated to reveal adverse authority
where the client's interests might be harmed, there would seem to be no
reason why attorneys should not be required to disclose proced ral
information that does not involve the merits of the case.
Model Rule 3.3(d) is the other subsection of Model Rule 3.3 which
requires disclosure of procedural information. It requires attorneys in ex
parte proceedings to inform the judge of all facts known to the attorney
which the judge should know about before deciding the matter at issue.101
The relevant comment states the obvious: there is a need for complete
disclosure because the other side is not represented.'02 The comment also
reflects the premise of the adversary system: "Ordinarily, an advocate has
the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a
tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the conflictingposition is
expected to be presented by the opposing party."'' 3 It follows that when
things are not as they seem-when the parties are no longer as adversarial
as they appear-the judge should be aware of that fact.
A 1994 Note in the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics analyzes
Model Rule 3.3(d)-its common law roots, legislative history, and
application."° Rule 3.3(d) requires disclosure of all material facts in
situations where the adversary system cannot be relied on to produce that
information. "The 'rare instances' where the Model Rules do utilize the
attorney's role as officer of the court to aid in ascertaining the truth tend to
be those cases where the adversarial process either breaks down or does not
come into play at all."'01 Secret agreements such as the agreement in Potter
of the lawyers surveyed said they would not cite adverse authority).
100 WILLIAM FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK 305-06 (1996) (citing Massey v. Prince George's
County, 907 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D. Md. 1995)).
101 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d).
,
02 See id. Rule 3.3 cmt.
'o
3 Id. Rule 3.3 cmt. (emphasis added).
'o
4 See Jill M. Dennis, Note, The Model Rules and the Search for Truth: The
Origins and Applications of Model Rule 3.3(d), 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 157
(1994).
1051 d. at 157.
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tend to break down the normal adversarial process. Requiring disclosure of
procedural informationwouldthus be consistentwiththe present disclosure
requirements of Model Rule 3.3 and would carry out the implicit promise
that attorneys will act as officers of the court rather than as mere agents for
their clients.
B. Judicial Authority for the Obligation to Disclose
Occasionally judges are expansive in describing the duty to disclose.
For example, Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Fusari v. Steinberg,"0 6
said, "[T]is Court must rely on counsel to present issues fully and fairly,
and counsel have a continuing duty to inform the Court of any development
which may conceivably affect an outcome."' 7 Looking at the situations in
which courts have said there is a duty to disclose accomplishes two ends:
first, to support the proposition that judges expect attorneys to disclose
procedural information; and second, to identify what judges expect to be
disclosed and help define procedural information.
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
It is axiomatic that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on
a court by agreement. 18 Courts have an independent duty to examine the
basis ofjurisdiction.'0 9 In Richmond v. Chater,"° Judge Posner criticized
the Social Security Administration for failing to challenge the court's
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim. "Jurisdiction cannot be stipulated...
and lawyers violate their duties as officers of the court when they agree to
suppress their doubts about the court's jurisdiction."'Il
" Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975). InFusari, the plaintiff claimed that
he was denied due process by Connecticut's summary termination of his
unemployment benefits. The district court declared the Connecticut law
unconstitutional, and the state of Connecticut appealed to the Supreme Court. After
the district court decision the state amended its procedures to meet the district
court's concerns. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light
of the change in the law. Justice Powell noted that the parties had failed to inform
the Court of the changes. See id. at 379.
107 Id. at 390-91 (Burger, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
118 See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1951).
'09 See Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441,445 (5th Cir. 1998).
"o Richmond v. Chater, 94 F.3d 263 (7th Cir. 1996).
"l Id. at 267.
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D. Mootness and Justiciability
In an early case,"' Justice Brandeis said the following about a
stipulation which appeared contrary to the facts:"'
If the stipulation is to be treated as an agreement concerning the legal
effect of admitted facts, it is obviously inoperative; since the court cannot
be controlled by agreement of counsel on a subsidiary question of law. If
the stipulation is to be treated as an attempt to agree "for the purpose only
of reviewing the judgment" below that what are the facts shall be assumed
not to be facts, a moot or fictitious case is presented. "The duty of this
court, as of every judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of
persons or of property, which are actually controverted in the particular
case before it .... No stipulation of parties or counsel, whether in the case
before the court or in any other case, can enlarge the power, or affect the
duty, of the court in this regard."'"14
During World War II, Congress passed price control legislation
which authorized the Price Administrator to control rent.115 An
enterprising landlord subsidized a suit by one of his tenants for the purpose
of challenging the constitutionality of the Emergency Price Control Act.
The tenant never met the attorney, obtained and paid for by the landlord,
who filed suit for the tenant against the landlord." 6 The district court held
the act to be unconstitutional after a hearing in which the tenant did
not appear." 7 On appeal, the United States intervened and complained
about the collusive nature of the suit. The Supreme Court agreed, vacated
the district court judgment, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the
case.
118
" See Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281 (1917).
" The parties stipulated that a railroad track was a "private" track. Justice
Brandeis thought the record clearly showed the track was not private. See id. at
285.
1 4 Id. at 289-90 (footnote omitted) (quoting California v. San Pablo & Tulare
R.R Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893)).
.
5 See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304-05 (1943) (per curiam).
"'
6 See id. at 303-04.
117 See id. at 303.
' See id. at 305.
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In Douglas v. Donovan,"9 the court of appeals hadthe following to say
about the failure of counsel to inform the court of an agreement which
rendered the appeal moot.
Despite the preemptive effect that the settlement agreement has had
on the present litigation, counsel for neither Douglas nor the [Department
of Labor] properly informed this court of its existence. In the original
briefs filed before this court, for example, there is barely any mention of
the settlement agreement... Even worse, the settlement came to the
attention of the court only accidentally at oral argument when Douglas'
[sic] counsel was about to conclude his statement. Until that last minute
reference, neither party mentioned the settlement agreement during thirty
minutes of oral argument.
As officers of this Court, counsel have an obligation to ensure that the
tribunal is aware of significant events that may bear directly -on the
outcome of the litigation .... This is especially true for government
attorneys, who have special responsibilities to both this court and the
public at large.'
20
"1 Douglas v. Donovan, 704 F.2d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The plaintiff in
Douglas filed suit in federal court to enjoin the Department of Labor from honoring
a state garnishment of his Federal Employees' Compensation Act ("FECA")
benefits. The plaintiff's ex-wife had obtained a garnishment order from an Iowa
state court for back alimony and child support. See id. at 1277. The district court
held that FECA benefits were not subject to garnishment and ordered the return of
monies which had been deposited with the court clerk. See id. at 1278. The
Department of Labor appealed. While the case was on appeal, the plaintiff and his
wife settled their differences. They divided the money in the registry of the district
court and agreed on a child support and alimony figure to be paid directly to the
wife by the Department of Labor. See id.
The Department ofLaborwas aparty to the settlement (it agreed to pay benefits
directly to the wife) but did not want the case dismissed for mootness. See id. at
1279. The department wanted the court of appeals to decide whether or not FECA
benefits were subject to garnishment. Apparently, it persuaded Douglas, the
plaintiff, to continue the litigation (as appellee on appeal) even though the outcome
could not affect Douglas since Douglas and his wife had agreed that their
settlement would not be affected by the outcome of the appeal. See id.
The court of appeals did not hesitate to dismiss the appeal as moot when it
realized that the plaintiff and his wife had settled their dispute. The court noted that
the settlement had made it "virtually impossible" for there to be a future
garnishment of Douglas's FECA benefits. Id.
2OId. at 1279.
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Clearly, attorneys must inform courts when a case is moot or non-
justiciable.'2 '
E. Real Party in Interest
The issue of real party in interest has arisen, interestingly, in non-
collusive cases involving the death of a party. In Kentucky Bar Ass 'n v.
Geisler,'m an attorney was publicly reprimanded for accepting a settlement
offer without telling opposing counsel and the court that her client had
died. The court based its opinion in part on the fact that, without court
appointment, the attorney lacked authority to act for the estate which had
become the real party in interest.'2
F. Identity of the Parties
In several cases, attorneys have substituted "ringers" in an attempt to
cause witnesses to identify the ringer as the person who committed the
crime.' 24 United States v. Thoreen'-5 is notable because Thoreen, the
defense attorney, was convicted for criminal contempt for his part in the
ruse. Thoreen's client was charged with illegal salmon fishing.126 Thoreen
dressed a man named Mason in the same kind of clothing as the client,
Sibbett, had been wearing and seated him at counsel table. 27 Sibbett wore
business clothes and sat in the spectator seats. Thoreen pretended Mason
121 See, e.g., Muhammad v. City of New York Dep't of Corrections, 126 F.3d
119,123 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Such an agreement disserves the courts: lawyers, who are
officers of the court, should not undertake to overlook jurisdictional questions that
courts in the first instance expect the parties to raise.").
' Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997).
See id. at 579 (following ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 95-397 (1995)); see also Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse &
Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 507, 512 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (stating that although
a lawyer has a duty to represent his client zealously, he owes a duty to the court to
inform it of the death of a plaintiff); In re A, 554 P.2d 479, 481 (Or. 1976)
(discussing deponent's statement that his mother was in Salem but failure to
mention that she was buried in Salem).
24 See, e.g., People v. Simac, 603 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992), affdby
641 N.E.2d 416 (Ill. 1994); United States v. Sabater, 830 F.2d 7, 8 (2d Cir. 1987).
11 United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981).




was the client and did not correct the judge when the judge referred to
Mason as Sibbett.2 8 After government witnesses misidentified Mason as
Sibbett, Thoreen revealed the substitution.'29 The government sought and
obtained leave to reopen, the witnesses were recalled and identified Sibbettt
as the defendant, and Sibbett was convicted.130
Thoreen was then convicted of criminal contempt for his part in
deceiving the court as to the identity of the person at counsel table. In
upholding the conviction, the court of appeals said that Thoreen's conduct
was "contumacious misbehavior" that obstructed justice. 11 The court held
that Thoreen deceived the judge in order to trick the witnesses. 32 The court
suggested that Thoreen should have asked the judge to allow an experiment
in which the witnesses would have had to pick the defendant out of a
group' 33
In Thoreen, the attorney played an active role in deceiving the judge.
Recent cases134 and ethics opinions say-properly-that an attorney may not
represent a client operating under an alias unless the client consents to the
revelation of his true identity to the court. 3 1 In litigation, an attorney
speaks on behalf of a client. By so doing, the attorney implicitly warrants
that the client is who he appears to be. When arrested for traffic offenses,
drivers sometimes produce false identification. The drivers in State v.
Casby136 and Attorney Grievance Committee v. Rohrback'17 maintained
their false identities to avoid the consequences of their past driving
convictions. The attorneys in these cases went along with the fraud. The
result? In Casby, the attorney was convicted of a criminal offense. 138 In
Rohrback, the attorney was suspended for forty-five days. 139 In both cases,
the attorneys had assisted the fraud reluctantly.
2 See id.
129 See id. at 1336-37.
130 See id. at 1337.
13' Id. at 1339.
132 See id.
133 See id. at 1342 n.7.
131 See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm. v. Rohrback, 591 A.2d 488,494 (Md.
1991).
135 See FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 100, at 310 n.14 (citing Fla. Op. 90-6
(1990), Va. Op. 1331 (1990), Mass. Op. 89-1 (1989), Pa. Op. 89-140 (1989)).
136 State v. Casby, 348 N.W.2d 736,737 (Minn. 1984).
137 Rohrback, 591 A.2d at 488.
138 See Casby, 348 N.W.2d at 737.
139 See Rohrback, 591 A.2d at 488.
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There is no evidence that the prosecutors in these cases were aware of the
defendants' true identities. Nonetheless, the result should be the same even
if the prosecutor is aware ofthe defendant's identity. The judge has a right to
assume that counsel will set the record straight if the defendant is someone
other than who he appears to be.
G. Secret Agreements
This Article argues for the proposition that attorneys have an obligation
to reveal any secret arrangement which alters the positions of the parties. The
authority for that obligation is found in the "Mary Carter" cases, named after
a Florida case that first considered a secret agreement in which the plaintiff
settledwith a defendant in return for the defendant remaining in the litigation
and undermining a co-defendant. 1' Such agreements are designed to mislead
the jury into thinking that the settling defendant is antagonistic to the plaintiff
and aligned with the co-defendant when in fact the settling defendant is
helping the plaintiff.4 ' "A typical Mary Carter agreement usually has the
following features: a. secrecy; b. contracting defendant remains inthe lawsuit;
c. contracting defendant guarantees plaintiff a certain monetary recovery; d.
contracting defendant's liability is decreased in direct proportion to the
increase in the non-agreeing defendants' liability."'142
Mary Carter agreements are designed to unfairly prejudice non-agreeing
defendants. In some instances, the plaintiff and settling defendant have
attempted to conceal the settlement not only from the jury but also from the
judge and opposing counsel. Courts considering Mary Carter agreements um-
formly hold that there is a duty to disclose such agreements to the judge and
that the obligation runs not just to opposing counsel butto the court as well. 4
,4 Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. App. 1967). "Mary
Carter" agreements have been the subject of much discussion. See, e.g., John
Benedict, It's a Mistake to Tolerate the Mary Carter Agreement, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 368 (1987); J. Michael Phillips, Looking Outfor May Carter Agreements,
69 WASH. L. REv. 255 (1994); John Quinn & Thomas Weaver, Mary Carter
Agreements, LrrIG., Spring 1994, at 41.
141 See FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 100, at 318.
142Hoops v. Watermelon City Trucking, Inc., 846 F.2d 637,640 (10th Cir. 1988).
,
43 See Lytle v. Steams, 830 P.2d 1197,1203 (Kan. 1992) (holding that counsel
must promptly disclose such an agreement to opposing counsel and the court); City
of Houston v. Wallace, 585 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Tex. 1979) (holding that where
employee had no interest in the consolidated case due to settlement, candor
required that the court be informed to prevent submission of meaningless issues to
the jury); Mustang Equip., Inc. v. Welch, 564 P.2d 895, 898 (Ariz. 1977) (stating
that the agreement must be communicated both to opposing counsel and to the
court prior to trial); Faber v. Roelofs, 212 N.W.2d 856, 861 (Minn. 1973) ("When
a plaintiff settles with one of several defendants, fairness requires that full
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If the agreement is revealed, the judge decides whether the jury is entitled to
know the true relationship of the litigants.1"
In settling its liability for the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Exxon paid seven
Seattle food processors (the "Seattle Seven") $70 million in compensatory
damages.'45 The secret agreement required the Seattle Seven to "take all
reasonable, lawful and ethical... actions to assist Exxon so that Exxon may
recapture or obtain a credit or offset for any punitive damages... to which
Claimants may have been entitled."'1 The agreement required the Seattle
Seven to participate in any class action for punitive damages, to assert a claim
for a share of the damages, and to assign its share to Exxon, which would
have the effect of creating a credit for Exxon against the total punitive
damages award.147 The jury fixed punitive damages at $5 billion." The
Seattle Seven fulfilled their share of the bargain by asking for 14.9% of the
punitive damages, or $745 million.149 Ifthis claim hadbeen sustained, Exxon
would have benefittedby obtaining a credit against punitive damages ofmore
than ten times what it had paid the Seattle Seven.
After finding out the details of the secret agreement, the presiding judge
held that the Seattle Seven would not share in the punitive damages, and thus
disclosure be made to the trial court and to all parties so that all will know the
posture from which each tries the lawsuit.").
14 See Ratterree v. Bartlett, 707 P.2d 1063, 1074-75 (Kan. 1985); FORTUNE ET
AL., supra note 100, at 318-19. In Dosdurisan v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241 (Fla.
1993), the Florida Supreme Court went further. The court held that such
agreements are void as against-public policy, not only because of the unfairness to
the non-settling defendant, but because of the necessity to "make
misrepresentations to the court and to the jury in order to maintain the charade of
an adversarial relationship." Id. at 244. One of the basic assumptions is that the
parties' litigating positions are as they are represented to be; that they are not
simulating antagonistic positions in order to obtain a tactical advantage. The
attorneys must tell the judge if their positions are other than as they appear to be.
See id.
141 SeeIn re The Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1996 WL 384623, at *7 (D.
Alaska June 11, 1996), affd, 161 F.3d 12 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Amy Woods,
In re Exxon Valdez: The Danger ofDeception in a Novel Mary Carter Agreement,
21 SEAITLE U. L. REV. 413 (1997).
In re The Exxon Valdez, 1996 WL 384623, at *8.
147 See id. A 1996 amendment allowed the Seattle Sevento keep a small amount
of the punitive damages award. See id. at *9.
148 See id. at *12.
149 Under the 1996 amendment, the Seattle Seven would have been entitled to
keep $12.4 million, leaving the credit to Exxon at $732.6 million. See id. at *9.
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Exxon would receive no credit against the award. The judge deemed it
"repugnant" and misleading for the parties to withhold this agreement from
the court. 15°
III. APPLICATION OF A RULE REQUIRING
DISCLOSURE OF PROCEDURAL INFORMATION
A. The Advantage ofHaving a Rule RequiringDisclosure
Most lawyers prefer to do what judges expect of them. Lawyers believe
that failing to do what is expected of them will harm their reputations. If, as
contended in this Article, judges expect lawyers to volunteer information
about procedural matters, then they will think badly of a lawyer who fails in
this regard. A lawyer may not, however, act in derogation of the client's
interest unless: 1) the client consents to the action; or 2) the lawyer is required
to so act. The advantage of requiring disclosure is that the lawyer thereby is
given an excuse to do the right thing. The lawyer can simply tell the client
that there is no choice; disclosure is mandatory.
Several ABA Opinions support this way of thinking. ABA Informal
Opinion 86-1518111 states that a lawyer is not required to tell a client that an
opponent, in drafting a document, has made an error in the client's favor.
Why? The client has no right to take advantage of the error."' ABA Formal
Opinion 92 -3 6 8 15 states that a lawyer should return misaddressed faxes and
letters which might contain confidential information without reading them.'5
"Like the ABA informal opinion on drafting errors, ABAFormal Opinion 92-
368 provides 'cover' for a lawyer to do the 'right thing'-that is to return the
documents unread without giving the client a say in the matter."155 Clients
have no legitimate expectation that their lawyers will read misdirected
documents, and perhaps the greatest value of the ABA opinion is to
discourage lawyers from allowing their clients to make the call on this
issue. 51 Similarly, the rule proposed in this Article would require a lawyer to
50 Id. at *13.
M ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 86-
1518 (1986).
152 See id.
" ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368
(1992).
154 See id.
155 FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 100, at 196.
156 See id. at 196-97.
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disclose procedural information which the lawyer recognizes should in
fairness be disclosed.
Requiring disclosure of procedural information would admittedly inject
an element of uncertainty into the Model Rules, but there is already uncer-
tainty over what must be disclosed. For example, ABA Formal Opinion 94-
387 l1 says that a lawyer is not required to disclose that a claim is barred by
the statute of limitations, while ABA Formal Opinion 95-39758 says that a
lawyermust disclose the death ofa client. Therefore, the proposedrule should
only require disclosure in obvious situations: where it is clear that the
information does not run to the merits of the controversy, and where the
lawyer recognizes that he or she is not entitled to the benefit which will result
from nondisclosure. Based on the authorities cited above, information
affecting the following matters must be disclosed:
(a) subject matter jurisdiction;
(b) mootness and justiciability;
(c) real party in interest;
(d) identity; and
(e) agreements which alter the relationship of the parties.
The duty to disclose should also extend to the following:
(a) the status of settlement negotiations;
(b) whether or not there is insurance;
(c) judicial procedural errors which could be exploited; 159 and
(d) judicial errors about matters of record.16°
No attorney should be sanctioned for failing to disclose information
unless the information is clearly procedural. For example, consider the
following hypothetical posed in ABA Formal Opinion 287:61
In a criminal case, the lawyer learns that the client has a criminal record. At
sentencing the clerk tells the judge that the client has no record. The judge
then says, "Since you have no record, I'm going to put you on probation."
What should the lawyer do? Is the answer different if the judge adds, "Isn't
'
57 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-387
(1994) (cautioning that there may be an obligation to disclose if the limitation
period affects jurisdiction).
"'
58 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-397
(1995).
For example, failure to swear the jury would fall in this category.
'
60 For example, the date on which a pleading was filed would belong in this
category.
' ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953).
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that right, counsel?" Does it make a difference if the lawyer learned of the
record from the client? 162
While the Ethics Committee was divided on how to handle the judge's
questions, it determined that the lawyer was not required to volunteer
information to correct the judge's misunderstanding.163 The committee
recognized that the client's record, while not running to the merits of the
charge, containedrelevant information about the clientwhichthejudge might
use to the client's detriment."
Attorneys reading this Article can probably think of information that, in
the relevant circumstances, could be legitimately classified as either
procedural or substantive- These are the tough calls. While a judge might be
offended by nondisclosure in such a case, the attorney may not disclose
without the consent of the client. The default rule in such a case is
nondisclosure because attorneys are bound by the duties of confidentiality 65
and loyalty" not to reveal adverse information without client consent.
CONCLUSION
Judges have a right to expect attorneys to tell them about procedural
matters, matters not running to the merits ofthe controversy. However, in the
absence of a rule requiring such disclosure, attorneys cannot disclose
information if the disclosure might harm the client or strip away an advan-
tage. This Article began with an example, drawn from a real-life experience,
in which I did not tell thejudge that thejury had not been sworn. I knew that
the judge would reasonably expect to be told, and I knew the judge would
think it unfair of me not to tell him. In the absence of a rule requiring
disclosure, however, I could not give up the procedural "hole card," which
could be played for my client's benefit at a later time. I should have been able
to tell the judge he had not sworn the jury, but I could not do so. If there had
been a rule requiring disclosure ofprocedural information, I wouldhave been
able to act as an officer of the court and do the right thing.
162 Id., reprinted in FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 100, at 308.
163 See id.
16 See id.
16 5 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998).
1 See id. Rules 1.1, 1.2.
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